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Abstract: This essay contextualises the emergence of a document regime which regulated 
routine travel through the deployment of the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme in 
1952. It suggests that such travel documents were useful for the new Indian state to 
delineate citizenship and the nationality of migrants and individual travellers from 
Pakistan. The bureaucratic and legal mediations under the Scheme helped the Indian 
state to frame itself before its new citizens as the sole certifier of some of their rights as 
Indians. In contrast, applicants for these documents viewed them as utilitarian, meant to 
facilitate their travel across the new borders. The contrast and contestation between such 
different perceptions helps us to understand the continued significance of documentary 
identities in contemporary India. 
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In the summer of 1955, N. Basar Khan and his wife, Amirunnissa, residents of Madras, 
applied to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in India for Indian passports. They 
planned to visit Basar Khan’s ailing mother in Peshawar in Pakistan.1 They applied for 
the India–Pakistan passport that had specifically regulated travel between India and 
Pakistan since October 1952. Although the Khans’ applications were routine requests for 
travel, they were denied. The MHA, in consultation with the Ministry of External Affairs 
(MEA),
2
 determined that Khan and his wife were not Indians but Pakistanis, and 
therefore ineligible to hold Indian passports. They noted that although Khan’s birthplace, 
Peshawar, had been part of British India when he was born in 1923, it had become part of 
Pakistan in 1947. The officials reasoned that this made Khan a Pakistani. If Khan was a 
Pakistani, then his wife (who was born in Madras) had become a Pakistani as well by 
virtue of her marriage.
3
 Other considerations, such as Khan’s residence in Madras since 
1943, his employment there as a driver for a local import-export company, or a 
recommendation from the local authorities that he be given a restricted passport for 
travel, mattered little.
4
  
 Why and how did Indian authorities determine that Khan and his wife were 
Pakistanis? The couple indicated no desire to migrate to Pakistan, nor was their 
application meant to recognise national status. How did the travel request, temporary by 
definition, confirm nationality and formal citizenship? This article suggests that in the 
1950s, as the newly-independent Indian state debated the different criteria for citizenship 
                                                        
1
 Grant of an India–Pakistan passport, Shri N. Basar Khan and his wife, 1955, MEA, 41(61) 55-
PSP, National Archives of India (hereafter NAI). 
2
 The MHA and MEA were the key central ministries in India tasked with determining various 
policies regarding international travel, national security and citizenship. 
3
 Until the Citizenship Act of 1955, women’s nationality transferred to their husbands’ nationality 
on marriage.  
4
 Grant of an India–Pakistan passport, Shri N. Basar Khan and his wife, 1955. 
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of India, the movement of individuals and families across India’s borders with Pakistan 
became essential to such deliberations. While scholars have argued that Partition refugees 
were central to citizenship debates,
5
 I shift focus to those who sought to move 
temporarily, either to maintain contact with their extended families, now in a different 
country, or to navigate the uncertainties of the post-Partition moment.  
This article directs attention to such intermittent and often casual movement to 
highlight it, rather than Partition-related migration, informed debates around Indian 
citizenship in the decades after Independence. In the 1950s, such routine movement came 
under official scrutiny through the imposition of documents such as passports, visas, 
Emergency Certificates, No Objection Certificates, repatriation and migration certificates. 
I argue that, through the imposition of what I call a documentary regime on what 
previously had been unrestricted movement, the Indian state (and the Pakistani state) 
sought to establish themselves as sole arbiters on the issue of movement beyond their 
borders. A well thought-out plan to impose documentary control over mobility, I argue, 
also helped Indian authorities differentiate between travellers, migrants, citizens and non-
citizens, and extend certain rights of formal, if not legal, citizenship on those who carried 
these documents. These documents guaranteed certain ‘paper rights’ to their holders: the 
right to exit and return to the nation-state; and implied some others: the right to residence, 
domicile and work; the right not to be deported; and in some cases, the right to be 
naturalised as Indian citizens under the Citizenship of India Act of 1955. Further, such a 
documentary regime was not an automatic response to becoming a territorial nation-state. 
Instead I suggest that such a regime borrowed from previous genealogies of documentary 
                                                        
5
 Joya Chatterji, ‘South Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–1970’, in The Historical Journal, 
Vol. 55, no. 4 (2012), pp. 1049–71; and Niraja Gopal Jayal, Citizenship and Its Discontents An 
Indian History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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identities, and evolved slowly as a process through the complex interactions between the 
state’s legal system, its bureaucrats and politicians, and ordinary people who consistently 
tested the regulatory intentions.  
A central artefact of this evolving documentary regime was the India–Pakistan 
Passport and Visa Scheme (hereafter the Scheme), which in October 1952 proposed a 
specific passport system between India and Pakistan. The Scheme emerged out of a need 
to standardise the post-Partition permit system that had, from 1948, regulated Partition 
migration between India and West Pakistan. Under the Scheme, travellers between India 
and Pakistan would now be required to obtain the India–Pakistan Passport and apply for 
travel to the other country before embarking on their travels. Further, it sought to 
delineate the reasons for travel—work, family visits, and permanent migration—in order 
to categorise movement. The Scheme established a direct link between the new Indian 
nation-state and its inhabitants. The process of applying for these documents required 
travellers to answer a set of predetermined questions, and engage with the bureaucratic 
regimen of the new state. These questions led to lengthy inquisitions and investigations, 
and sometimes court appearances, in order to prove residence and national allegiance. 
Such documents were at the forefront of certifying nationality, so creating a link between 
the abstract nation-state and its citizens.  
In essence, passports and visas introduced a new notion of documentary identity 
into a relatively paperless and non-literate society. The booklet, India–Pakistan Passport 
and Visa Scheme, guaranteed the ‘right to return’ to India and, consequently, implied 
inclusion within the nation-state. Passport identities quickly became nationalised 
identities. Those who held these passports could clearly be identified as nationals of India 
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 
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or Pakistan, and they now had documentary proof of their national allegiance. Non-
ownership of these papers or unsuccessful applications for the Indian passport exposed a 
person to the possibility of being officially marked as an infiltrator, or a Pakistani 
national, and often both. It also exposed one to the possibility of deportation or 
incarceration.  
The imposition of passports and visas
6
 incorporated and deployed a range of 
bureaucratic and legal apparatuses and personnel. The Indian state emerged as the sole 
guarantor of the rights of nationality and citizenship.
7
 The central ministries—the 
Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs—and legal institutions 
such as High Courts and the Supreme Court, the local district magistrate and the police, 
were brought in to help in implementing the Scheme. While passport operations in British 
India had been similar in their aim to control mobility, the Scheme differed because it had 
a restricted mandate to control mobility between India and Pakistan only. It was also new 
in its specific relationship with the movement of, and consequent ascriptions of legal 
status of, Muslim minorities in post-Partition India. Time and again, the documentary 
regime was informed and influenced by cases of Muslims, such as Bashar Khan, which 
not only received additional scrutiny, but were open to contextual interpretation. Mobility 
of Muslim men was taken as evidence of disloyalty to the Indian nation and pro-Pakistan 
sentiments.
8
 The India–Pakistan Passport thus became material proof of a desire for an 
                                                        
6
 These documents are part of a larger ongoing process of documenting identity through ration 
cards, caste certificates, citizenship certificates and, most recently, the biometric Aadhar card. 
7
 Adam McKeown argues that the process of creating nation-states created new identities by 
removing people from traditional social identities that were determined by who knows or vouches 
for a person, and redefined people into bureaucratic categories. Adam McKeown, Asian 
Migration and Globalization of Borders (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 
8
 In the post-Partition context, this was not new and several scholars have noted the prevalence of 
automatic assumptions of disloyalty regarding Muslims in India. See Gyanendra Pandey, ‘Can a 
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alternative nationality. Furthermore, Muslims like Basar Khan, who were born outside 
the new territories of independent India, were often identified simply as ‘Pakistanis’ and 
told to apply for Pakistani passports. Taylor Sherman, in a recent essay on Hyderabad in 
1949, has shown that resident Afghans, Pathans and Arabs, some of whom were money-
lenders or petty traders, began to be regarded as ‘Pakistani’ and that such everyday 
understandings of citizenship became tied to being ‘Muslim’.9 
In the period when legal understandings of citizenship had yet to become clear, 
the India–Pakistan Passport became more than a travel document in the eyes of the Indian 
state. The right to mobility was one of the first ways in which Indian citizenship and 
claims of belonging would be defined and then contested. Thus Basar Khan’s residence 
in Madras did not raise claims to Indian nationality and the authorities remained 
unconcerned with his living in India. It was only when Khan required permission to travel 
to another country that his nationality became debatable. That the Indian authorities 
focused on his place of birth rather than his continued residence and domicile in India in 
determining Khan’s nationality highlights how, in the case of Muslims, routine 
interactions with the Indian state often had to negotiate demands of citizenship and 
loyalty. 
This article is divided into three sections. The first traces a genealogy of the 
India–Pakistan passport through its colonial avatar, the British Indian passport, and links 
it to the emergence of the permit system in 1948. The British Indian passport had a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Muslim be an Indian?’, in Tan Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya (eds), Partition and Post-
Colonial South Asia: A Reader (London: Routledge, 2008) Vol. 3, pp. 59–82; Chatterji, ‘South 
Asian Histories of Citizenship, 1946–52’, pp. 1049–71; and Taylor Sherman, ‘Migration, 
Citizenship and Belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 1946–1956’, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 
45, no. 1 (2011), pp. 81–107. 
9
 Sherman, ‘Migration, Citizenship, and Belonging’, p. 107. 
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history of surveillance, verification and guaranteed passage within and outside the British 
Empire for specific groups of people. The permit system, instituted after Partition, drew 
upon some of these pre-1948 links between documenting identity and mobility 
established by the colonial predecessor. The Scheme had an earlier history informed by 
colonial understandings of mobility and identity, as well as by communal logic in the 
immediate aftermath of Partition. As we will see, the Scheme inherited some of these 
facets but also brought into sharper focus the contextual aspects of documenting identity. 
The second section examines the processes surrounding the implementation of the 
Scheme in 1952. It shows that even though the regulations under the Scheme appeared to 
be detailed and comprehensive, its official passage was plagued by inter-Dominion 
wrangling and its implementation was uneven. It explores the piecemeal, contextual, and 
often protracted technologies of implementing a document regime that turned routine 
border-crossers into spies, dissidents and infiltrators. The third section focuses 
specifically on Muslims whose applications for an India–Pakistan passport raised 
questions regarding their citizenship and helped link travel documents with rights of 
belonging and residence.  
I would like to add an initial caveat about the scope of this article. The ability of 
the Indian state to enforce the documentary regime that it conceived proved very limited 
due to lack of resources, the ethno-linguistic similarities of the border-crossers,
10
 and the 
volume of migrants, especially between India and East Pakistan. More people remained 
‘undocumented’ when they crossed the border than those who crossed carrying India–
                                                        
10
 Willem Van Schendel’s excellent work on the Bengal borderland clearly indicates the inability 
of India and Bangladesh to control the border, especially smuggling and the movement of people 
living in the borderland, and the consequent ongoing border disputes. See Willem van Schendel, 
The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia (London: Anthem Press, 2005). 
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Pakistan passports. These undocumented travellers and migrants become more visible via 
the numbers estimated and published in official press reports, in the arrest records of 
border police files, and as faceless yet collective groups in the debates surrounding the 
India–Pakistan passport. This article focuses primarily on non-paradigmatic cases that left 
a paper trail in official files, legal cases, police verification reports, and contemporary 
news accounts. These cases help illuminate the limits of statecraft in the 1950s, the 
foundational decade of post-colonial state formation; and the actions of those who 
acquired documents in the hope of gaining ‘paper rights’. In that sense, the goal of the 
paper is to turn our attention to the continuing links between documentary and legal 
identity in contemporary India.  
 
Genealogy of a Document  
Passports and Certificates of Identity by themselves were not something new to 
the Indian subcontinent. Documents regulating travel can be traced back to the mid 
nineteenth century when the English East India Company issued documents guaranteeing 
consular protection. Later documents regulated travel for Hajj pilgrims,
11
 indentured 
labour, and migration to Australia, the Caribbean, Mauritius and eastern Africa
12
 
throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The incorporation of 
technology such as fingerprinting and photography helped define the carriers of these 
                                                        
11
 Radhika Singha provides an interesting description of the implementation of the pilgrim passes 
and ‘return’ tickets for Hajj pilgrims. See her ‘Passport, Ticket, and India-Rubber Stamp: ‘The 
Problem of the Pauper Pilgrim’ in Colonial India (c. 1882–1925)’, in Ashwini Tambe and Harald 
Fisher Tiné (eds), The Limits of British Control in South Asia: Spaces of Disorder in the Indian 
Ocean Region (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 49–83. 
12
 Such documents included coolie agreements for the sugar colonies, passbooks for Mauritius 
etc. See Marina Carter, Servants, Sirdars, and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874 (Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); and Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery; The Export of Indian 
Labour Overseas, 1830–1920 (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). 
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documents as individuals with a fixed identity, thus removing people from their 
traditional social identities and redefining them in bureaucratic and legal categories.
13
 In 
the case of British India, as Radhika Singha has shown, constructing new identities which 
could be verified through cross-referenced files was already underway not only for 
indentured labour, but also for various castes and ‘Criminal Tribes’. Individuals had to 
reproduce their recorded identities to gain access to military service, pensions, land 
grants, indenture contracts, and similar interactions with the colonial state.
14
  
While a number of different kinds of travel documents co-existed to control travel 
and migration in British India, in 1912 the British Indian passport emerged; it attested 
that its holder was a British subject of ‘certain means and respectability’.15 On one level, 
as Radhika Mongia suggests, its emergence, foregrounded in the debates on the fate of 
Indian migrants in Canada and South Africa, ‘nationalized bodies along racial lines’.16 
On another level, it allowed the colonial government to claim it maintained ‘international 
                                                        
13
 Several scholars have shown how new technical and bureaucratic identities emerged with the 
adoption of forensic scientific practices and their use in migration control by the state. See Jane 
Caplan and John Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State 
Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001). Also relevant 
here is the discussion of the United States passport by Craig Robertson. He makes the argument 
that this document soon became shorthand for the identity of its holder. Craig Robertson, The 
Passport in America: The History of a Document (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
14
 Radhika Singha, ‘Settle, Mobilize, Verify: Identification Practices in Colonial India’, in Studies 
in History, Vol. 16, no. 2 (2000), pp. 151–98. 
15
 Radhika Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in 
British India c. 1822–1922’, in Indian Economic and Social History Review, Vol. 50, no. 3 
(2013), p. 313. 
16
 Singha argues that the demand for an Indian passport by the Dominions suggests that the 
category of ‘British subject’ was available for division and differentiation based on the rules of 
colonial difference. Radhika Viyas Mongia, ‘Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the 
Passport’, in Public Culture: Bulletin of the Project for Transnational Cultural Studies, Vol. 11, 
no. 3 (1999), p. 529. 
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standards’, so appeasing Indian nationalists’ outrage at the prevalence of a ‘colour bar’ in 
international migration.
17
  
The British Indian passport was, in some respects, no different from its 
counterparts in post-World War I Western Europe and the United States.
18
 John Torpey 
shows that in these regions, passports functioned as documents that guaranteed the right 
to travel, but also whose possession differentiated law-abiding travellers from those 
whom the state did not deem suitable to acquire passports. More importantly, passports 
delineated nationality, controlled entry and exit from one country to another, and in the 
process produced ‘hard-edged’ nation-states.19 The British Indian passport similarly 
mandated regulations on travel and emigration, and required adherence to the now-
established practices of forensic identification. By 1917, as World War I continued, all 
Indians, other than indentured labourers and Hajj pilgrims, were required to carry the 
British Indian passport if proceeding outside India.
20
 The Indian Passport Act of 1920, on 
the other hand, made the passport a requirement for entry into India, but not for exiting 
the region. After 1918, the colonial state sought to retain certain wartime measures, 
arguing that the threat of Bolshevism required stricter controls on mobility. After the 
passing of the 1920 Act, passport applications were often used by the colonial state as a 
                                                        
17
 Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the Colony’, p. 291. 
18
 John Torpey’s work on the appearance of passports in post-First World War Europe and 
America discusses the emergence of passports due to a need to secure borders. John Torpey, The 
Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000).  
19
 Torpey argues that the states were not fully effective in controlling or enforcing such a system. 
Rather, they only monopolised the authority to restrict movement vis-a-vis other potential 
claimants such as private economic or religious entities. Ibid., p. 5.  
20
 Defence of India Act, 1915, cited in Singha, ‘The Great War and a “Proper” Passport for the 
Colony’, p. 292. 
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surveillance mechanism to selectively restrict the mobility of certain people.
21
 
Furthermore, deportations became de rigueur even in cases of technical violations of 
passport regulations.  
After 1947, both India and Pakistan began the transition to creating national 
passports to reflect their changed political status. Initially, the British Indian passport was 
re-named the Commonwealth passport, which marked its holders as British subjects. By 
July 1948, India had drafted a new ‘Indian’ passport which had two fundamental 
changes: the description now read ‘India’ instead of ‘Empire of India’; and the head of 
state was noted as the ‘Rashtrapati’ in Hindi and ‘President’ in English, instead of the 
‘Governor-General of India’. Furthermore, the Indian passport would no longer be 
printed in French. There was a cautionary warning from officials in the Constituent 
Assembly: ‘The term “India” cannot however be treated as final until the Constituent 
Assembly itself has adopted it’;22 until then, no definition of nationality or citizenship 
could be associated with the Indian passport. The new Indian passport controlled 
international movement, but special permits controlled mobility between Portuguese and 
French territories within India. Citizens of Tibet and the Maldives could get travel passes 
to India, while residents of Nepal and Bhutan were not required to carry any documents. 
In Pakistan, Kashmiris travelling from Pakistan to their hometowns were required to 
obtain special permits.
23
 Pilgrim passes continued to govern the travel of those Indians 
who wanted to make the Hajj pilgrimage. 
                                                        
21
 Ibid., pp. 308–13. 
22
 CA/105/Comm/48, 1948, Constituent Assembly, Constitution Section, NAI. 
23
 The India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme would specify further regulations and 
restrictions after 1952 for this group of travellers. See 10(10)-K/53, Ministry of States 1953, NAI. 
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Still, such travels paled in comparison to the post-Partition mass movements 
across India’s and Pakistan’s borders. Both countries quickly developed specific sets of 
documents to regulate these movements. In July 1948, India adopted a permit system 
across its western border with Pakistan to curb what it perceived to be the ‘one way 
traffic’ of Muslim refugees. Under the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, entry 
into India would now require a permit. Pakistan followed suit in October with the 
Pakistan (Control of Entry) Ordinance, claiming the need for internal security. However 
there was no permit system on the eastern border between West Bengal, Assam, and 
Tripura on the Indian side, and East Pakistan.
24
 The differing policies on the eastern and 
western borders stemmed from the Indian state’s understanding of the Partition 
experience in divided Bengal, where Partition migration was viewed as unwarranted and 
not significant.
25
  
In its goal to regulate specific mobility, i.e., post-Partition movement between 
India and Pakistan, permits discarded the idea of the ‘civic credential’ intrinsic to the 
British Indian passport, yet continued the requirement for signatures and photographs in 
order to identify border-crossers and, more importantly, violators of permit regulations. 
                                                        
24
 Before the India–Pakistan passport came into being, East Pakistan residents were often required 
to produce tax certificates to prove domicile, while Indian residents were restricted to 15 days 
stay in East Pakistan. In that sense, there was some documentary control, however haphazard. 
Hindustan Standard (28 April, 1948), p. 1. 
25
 Several scholars have highlighted this difference in understanding. See Haimanti Roy, 
Partitioned Lives: Migrants, Refugees, Citizens in India and Pakistan, 1947–1965 (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 2012); Joya Chatterji, ‘“Dispersal” and the Failure of Rehabilitation: Refugee 
Camp-Dwellers and Squatters in West Bengal’, in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, no. 5 (2007), 
pp. 995–1032; and Jashodhara Bagchi and Subhoranjan Dasgupta (eds), The Trauma and the 
Triumph: Gender and Partition in Eastern India (Kolkata: Stree, 2003). In another recent article, 
Joya Chatterji argues that these differing policies in the eastern region indicate a secularisation of 
bilateral politics between India and Pakistan. Joya Chatterji, ‘Secularisation and Partition 
Emergencies, Deep Diplomacy in South Asia’, in Economic & Political Weekly (14 Dec. 2013), 
pp. 42–50. 
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Five kinds of permits were issued from diplomatic representatives of India and Pakistan
26
 
located in Bombay, Jullundhar, Karachi and Lahore.
27
 In true bureaucratic fashion, these 
permits were printed in triplicate, bound as booklets, and serially machine-numbered. 
One copy was housed with the issuing authority, another with the superintendent of 
police at the destination, and the third was given to the border-crosser. Photographs were 
de rigueur to connect these slips of paper to the authorised holder.
28
  
While such permits represent, at one level, the desire for bureaucratic order 
amidst the chaos of Partition-generated displacement and violence, at another level, as 
Vazira Zamindar argues, permits began the process of ‘giving shape to unresolved 
questions of citizenship’, especially the citizenship of Muslims in India.29 In Zamindar’s 
view, the Indian state differentiated between Hindu and Muslim refugees, requiring the 
latter to apply for a permit for ‘permanent return’ to India, while the former could get 
permits for ‘permanent resettlement’ and access to the state’s rehabilitation programs.  
Zamindar’s argument about permits, that they were a first step in crafting post-
colonial citizenship, can be pushed further. The permit system, while unpopular with 
border-crossers, provided Indian authorities with an initial template to test its 
jurisdictional powers in regulating mobility, and to ascribe certain rights to those who 
resided within its borders. This is one of the first instances when the Indian state had full 
                                                        
26
 These were a permit for a temporary visit, for resettlement (for Hindus from Pakistan), for 
permanent return (for Muslims returning from Pakistan), for repeated travel and for transit travel 
between East and West Pakistan. 
27
 Residents of Pakistan who wanted to travel to India applied to the High Commission in Karachi 
or Lahore. See S.K. Mustafa, A Commentary on the Influx from Pakistan (Control) Act, 1949, 
with Exhaustive Notes, Up to-Date Rules and Case Law; Also Containing Useful Information 
About Passports, Visas and Pilgrim Passes, Etc. (Lucknow: Peoples Law Book House, 1952), p. 
86. 
28
 Ibid., p. 69. Photographs were required only for the male head of the family. 
29
 Vazira Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia. Refugees, 
Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 102–3. 
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authority to decide who was free to move and how to regulate what previously had been 
‘free travel’.30 
 The unpopularity of permits, jurisdictional needs after the promulgation of the 
Indian Constitution in 1950, and the need to standardise the control of mobility on their 
western and eastern borders, prompted both India and Pakistan to adopt the India–
Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme in October 1952.
31
 The Scheme introduced a special 
India–Pakistan passport that would exist alongside each country’s general passport. 
While the latter would regulate international travel, the former would concern itself only 
with travel between India and Pakistan. Together, these documents represented the initial 
steps towards sovereign nationhood, in line with international law.
32
 As well, it was 
hoped that a proper passport system would control and inhibit smuggling, and better 
enforce trade regulations between the two countries.
33
 However popular understanding 
saw them as a singular stopgap measure to curb the ongoing migration of Hindu Bengalis 
from East Pakistan to India. A cartoon which appeared one day before the start of the 
Scheme showed Nehru drowning in water marked ‘Growing West Bengal Population’, 
while he valiantly tried to stop more water pouring through the border wall with a tiny 
stopper marked ‘Passport’ (Figure 1).34 
                                                        
30
 For details on how the permit system operated in India and Pakistan, see ibid., pp.79–117. 
31
 Permits themselves lingered within the document regime. For example, residents of enclaves 
such as Dahagram along the eastern border were required to obtain permits for transitting through 
Indian territory. Permits are also used to control movement between Jammu and Kashmir, Goa 
and Tibet.  
32
 The Times of India (5 May 1952), p. 1. 
33
 Dawn (6 and 8 Sept. 1952), p. 1. 
34
 Amrita Bazar Patrika (14 Oct. 1952), p. 5. 
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Place Figure 1 hereabouts 
 
Figure 1. ‘Please, Just One Month’. Source: Amrita Bazar Patrika (14 Oct. 1952), p. 5. 
 
The Scheme emerged against the backdrop of two events that impacted upon East 
Pakistan and eastern India. The first was in East Pakistan, the Khulna Barisal riots of 
1950 that were echoed in Calcutta, and engendered the region’s largest cross-border 
migration of Hindus in its aftermath. Attempts by the East Pakistan police to control 
communist peasant activists were quickly interpreted in communal terms. Mimetic riots, 
which soon spread to eastern India, forced India and Pakistan to conclude the Delhi Pact 
which urged migrants to return home.
35
 While evoking images of post-Partition riots, still 
fresh in the public memory, the Khulna Barisal riots also questioned the legitimacy of 
                                                        
35
 For more details see Haimanti Roy, Partitioned Lives, esp. Chap. 5. 
H. Roy 
 16 
Pakistan’s viability as a new nation-state.36 The language riots in Dhaka, in early 1952, 
provided the second impetus. Rioting occurred on demands that Bengali, in addition to 
Urdu, be designated as Pakistan’s official language. As the East Pakistan state worked to 
quell both the demands and the rioters, they often alleged that an ‘Indian Hand’ was 
responsible for inciting violence. Consequently, East Pakistani authorities urged for 
closed borders on the grounds of national security.  
Not surprisingly, in response Pakistan announced in 1952 that it would impose 
passport regulations on all its borders with India.
37
 In a Press Note, Pakistan justified the 
need for its own passport and visa scheme, claiming the transition from permits to 
passports was logical given that ‘all genuine migrants have already returned to their 
respective homes and if they have not then they may be assumed to have no intention of 
returning’.38 Passports would delineate two kinds of movement: that engendered by 
Partition; and that which was routine and necessitated documentary regulation. For its 
part, the Indian government quickly agreed to Pakistan’s initiative, claiming it would 
alleviate travel hardship between the two countries. While it was clear that the new 
passport system would directly curb the continuous and chronic post-Partition migration 
between India and East Pakistan, authorities stressed the benefits of documentary controls 
in ‘nationalizing’ terms. C.C. Biswas, the minister for Law and Minority Affairs, noted 
that a passport system would ‘compel a large number of people who had interests on both 
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sides of the border to make up their minds as to their homeland’.39 Passports finally 
would situate people and establish the Indian state’s sovereignty in tangible ways. A 
resolution to Partition’s ambiguities regarding nationality and citizenship was reached by 
using terms such as ‘Bharati’ or ‘Pakistani’ that became commonplace in officially 
published documents and policy instructions. For example, a press note issued by the 
Indian deputy high commissioner in Dhaka stated that those ‘Bharati nationals’ who 
wished to remain in East Pakistan after the start of the passport system ‘will have to get a 
Bharati Passport with a proper visa from Pakistan authorities within three months from 
the date of the introduction of the Pakistan–Bharat passport system or before January 15, 
1953’.40 Assuring applicants their passport requests would be processed quickly, the press 
note emphasised the routineness of the process. Moreover, the application process would 
help authorities determine both choices about mobility and the nationality of the 
applicant. In this context visas, more than passports, would provide what Aristide Zolberg 
calls ‘control through remote control’.41 Visas would determine and verify the identities 
of those who did not belong, even before they began their journeys. 
Not everyone saw the benefits of implementing a passport system. Arguments 
against documentary control came primarily from East Pakistan, which had had ‘open’ 
borders with India until 1952. The Scheme’s detractors argued that documents would 
sunder age-old linguistic and cultural ties between East and West Bengal and impede the 
free movement of minority Hindus and Muslims which had been guaranteed by the Delhi 
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Pact of 1950.
42
 Some in India saw the Scheme as a ploy to scare Hindu minorities in East 
Pakistan into leaving their homes.
43
  
 Despite such reservations, India and Pakistan decided to proceed with this specific 
passport system. Representatives met in Karachi between 15 May and 19 May 1952 to 
establish modalities. Not surprisingly, the two countries found it difficult to agree. The 
disagreements were followed closely in the press of each country, and reflected the 
continued build-up of self-reflexive nationalism at its worst. The Morning News in Dhaka 
accused the Indian delegation of deliberately ‘sabotaging’ the conference and planning to 
‘paralyse the (Pakistan) government’.44 The Times of India (henceforth, The Times) 
reported that the Pakistan delegate was ‘uncompromising’, refusing even legitimate 
requests by the Indian delegates. The moral high ground was claimed for India; The 
Times noted that while Pakistan wanted to start the passport system on 15 August 1952, 
India had proposed 15 September as the starting date.
45
 India thus portrayed itself as one 
who sought to give border crossers more time to move freely and thus appear attuned to 
the people’s needs. The antagonism continued in subsequent meetings as authorities 
negotiated the finer details of the Scheme. Rather than bring ‘categorical closure’ in 
defining India and Pakistan, as Zamindar argues,
46
 adopting and implementing the 
passport system continued and even increased the inter-Dominion diplomatic wrangling, 
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bureaucratic confusion, and contingent contextual interpretations of documentary 
identities. 
 
Technologies of Travel 
The India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme finally started on the mutually-
agreed date of 15 October 1952. From that day forward, Indians travelling to Pakistan 
would have to obtain both a passport from India and a visa from Pakistan.
47
 Furthermore, 
travellers were required to now pass through officially-sanctioned border checkpoints.
48
 
Visas for Pakistanis travelling to India guaranteed free passage, but required visa holders 
to register at police stations, and restricted the number of days they could stay and the 
places they could visit in India. Visas helped categorise the purpose of travel and such 
categorisation was represented by different kinds of visas, ranging from A to F.
49
 
Within a month of the start of the passport system, the Indian authorities had 
received requests for 18,972 visas, 9,607 repatriation certificates, 1,985 migration 
certificates, and 9,134 passport applications.
50
 Passport officials in the eastern region 
complained about the considerable hardships and difficulties incurred due to the 
‘inevitable delays involved in dealing with a prodigiously large number of applications 
for visas, repatriation certificates and migration certificates from single visa offices in 
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Dhaka and Calcutta’.51 Despite processing problems, claims for the Scheme’s successful 
and smooth operation were supported by front-page pictures of empty border checkpoints 
in major newspapers.
52
 
The Scheme was different from its documentary predecessors in a number of 
ways. It diversified control by placing the responsibility for issuing passports onto the 
states rather than on central ministries and diplomatic missions. It was heavily 
bureaucratic both in terms of personnel and paperwork. While the MHA, MEA and the 
Ministry of Law consulted on and decided about atypical passport applications, the bulk 
of the day-to-day issuing of passports and visas was delegated to the district magistrate or 
the regional passport offices. These in turn depended on the state police to investigate the 
applicants’ backgrounds and character references which were pre-requisites for any 
successful application. Passport conferences between India and Pakistan held at regular 
intervals sought to make the application procedure easier, but in the process erased 
‘migration’ as a reason for travel.53 Moreover the Scheme oversaw a diversification of 
travel documents beyond just passports and visas as travel between India and Pakistan 
became categorised in different ways.  
From the perspective of Indian officials, routine and hitherto ‘free’ mobility now 
came under the Scheme’s requirement for documenting it. For example, cultivators and 
petty traders who lived in the borderland (defined as 10 miles on either side of the India–
Pakistan border) now were required to possess an F visa to pursue their livelihoods in this 
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region.
54
 To acquire these visas, borderland residents had to submit to the border 
authorities another set of documents—khatian or rent receipts, certificates from a Union 
Board or Panchayat president documenting residence, and often certificates from 
authorities across the border verifying legal trade and labour.
55
 These F visas were valid 
for five years or until the expiry of the holder’s passport, at which time the visa holder 
had to return to the local authorities for renewal. The F visa regulated routine cross-
border mobility; but it inadvertently also provided certain documentary ‘rights’ of 
residence that would be guaranteed by the Indian state. As well, these documents could, 
albeit in limited form, act as new forms of legal tender which protected the holders from 
being identified as ‘infiltrators’ and so being deported.56  
Obviously, visas were conditional on acquiring a passport. Passports or par patra 
were put into different categories: the international form, valid for international travel; the 
India–Pakistan passport for travel between India and West Pakistan, valid for one year; 
and the India–Pakistan (Eastern Zone) passport for travel between India and East 
Pakistan, valid for five years. From their inception, passports ascribed nationality to 
border-crossers and connected the individual to the document and to the issuing authority. 
The Scheme booklet declared: ‘Pakistan nationals visiting India will be required…to be 
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in possession of a valid passport duly visaed by an Indian diplomatic mission abroad, or 
by an official in India authorized by the Government of India to issue visas’.57 Those 
‘Pakistan nationals’ in India, with or without passports or permits, were to be given a 3-
month grace period, until 14 January 1953, to either acquire the relevant paperwork to 
remain in India or to return to their homes in Pakistan.
58
 Under the Scheme, successful 
applicants now would be able to have documentary proof of their nationality in addition 
to travel permissions. Since only Indian citizens could apply for an Indian passport, and 
only Pakistan citizens could apply for a Pakistan passport, the Scheme hoped to resolve 
the existing ambiguities regarding citizenship in the 1950s.  
However the Scheme went beyond just drafting regulations on passports and 
visas; it introduced a host of other documents to categorise travel. For example, members 
of ‘minority communities’ in Pakistan could apply for migration or 
resettlement/repatriation certificates instead of passports and visas. Migration certificates 
required applicants to express their intention to ‘permanently migrate’ to India by 
applying to Indian diplomatic missions in Dhaka, Karachi or Lahore.
59
 Between October 
1952 and January 1953, Indian nationals (defined by having residence or family ties in 
India) in Pakistan could apply for repatriation certificates that would guarantee a one-
time journey back to India. Both the migration certificate and the repatriation certificate 
guaranteed single border crossings for an entire family. The Indian state hoped that single 
journey certificates would reduce cross-border migration, and officially document that the 
applicants, families or individuals, had opted to leave Pakistan and become Indian 
citizens. The Scheme also introduced ‘landing cards’ for those Pakistani nationals who 
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may have fallen ill while in transit through India, and Nullies or Continuous Discharge 
Certificates for Pakistani seamen that would allow them to disembark and find 
employment in India. Under the Scheme, every kind of travel and traveller would be 
neatly categorised, and Indian authorities would establish not only bureaucratic order, but 
also legitimise it through such certificates. 
This blueprint for documentary order remained limited by rolling timelines, 
contextual interpretations of ambiguous policies, and insufficient resources and 
personnel.
60
 For example, confusion arose over the term ‘minority community’ which 
was the basic criteria for migration certificates. Were Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan the 
only groups who came under such rubric? Or did it define everyone who was not 
Muslim? What about members of Scheduled Castes whom Pakistan claimed were not 
part of the Hindu community in Pakistan and therefore not minorities? MHA and MEA 
officials reasoned that although applicants for migration certificates were primarily 
Hindus and Sikhs, certificates should be issued to all non-Muslim residents of Pakistan.
61
  
But this decision raised another dilemma; if all Pakistani non-Muslims were, 
hypothetically, eligible for migration certificates, India could potentially be inundated by 
the entire non-Muslim population of Pakistan. This would defeat the intention of the 
Scheme. Consequently, Indian authorities decided that migration certificates would not 
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be automatically issued, but would depend on the worth of each application.
62
 Low-level 
bureaucrats at the High Commissions in Karachi and Dhaka were instructed that 
‘facilities for migration should be given in all genuine cases but should not be available to 
every member of the minority community regardless of the merits of the case’.63 Further, 
those who had landed property or a business in Pakistan were not entitled to procure 
migration certificates ‘unless there was a danger to their life’, or in cases involving 
‘danger to the honour of women folk’.64 It was not clear how applicants were to proffer 
evidence to this effect. What was clear was that India’s humanitarian claims had to defer 
to the economic imperatives of limiting refugee and migrant populations.  
The instructions were particularly relevant to Hindu applicants located in East 
Pakistan as they sought to maintain both family ties in India and residential rights in 
Pakistan. Thus they would often apply for Pakistani passports and visas for India, which 
guaranteed them multiple journeys, rather than migration certificates. Having Pakistani 
passports also helped since, at the ‘time of leaving Pakistan, migrants [were] subjected to 
special searches and other harassments which persons travelling on Pakistan passports do 
not have to undergo’.65 Acquiring a Pakistani passport could also be used as documentary 
proof that one was not an evacuee or an ‘intending evacuee’; this allowed people to retain 
their claims to property that were in danger of falling under, and becoming forfeit to, the 
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rules of the Evacuee Property Laws.
66
 Thus the utilitarian benefits of acquiring a passport 
were clear to the applicants. 
However such utilitarian interpretations of travel documents conflicted with the 
Indian state’s conception of the links between documents, travel and citizenship. These 
conceptions came into sharper focus in discussions about those who had arrived in India 
with Pakistani passports. Early on, Article 9 of the Constitution of India had clearly 
linked the passport with citizenship by noting that if one voluntarily acquired a foreign 
passport, one would automatically lose Indian citizenship.
67
 This generated different sets 
of discussions depending on the religious identity of those who held Pakistani passports. 
While Muslims returning to India on Pakistani passports often found it difficult to claim 
Indian citizenship, Indian authorities debated whether Hindus from Pakistan travelling on 
Pakistani passports should be treated differently and allowed to become Indian citizens in 
the future. In a secret circular, MHA officials acknowledged the benefits of Hindu 
minorities in Pakistan obtaining a Pakistani passport, but also pointed out that there was a 
‘growing feeling in Pakistan that persons who take Pakistani passports thereby affirm 
their intention of staying in Pakistan and it is undesirable that this feeling should in any 
way be discouraged’.68 Rather, Hindus with Pakistani passports should be allowed less 
restricted travel once in India, but directed to retain their Pakistani passports until the 
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passage of the Indian Citizenship Act which would enable them to be naturalised as 
Indian citizens. 
The cases of Hindus with Pakistani passports who wanted to permanently settle in 
India created two bureaucratic problems that needed resolution: whether they could 
renounce their Pakistani nationality by simply surrendering their Pakistani passports; and 
whether they were legally on the same footing as those Hindus who had arrived in India 
on migration certificates. Badruddin Tyabji, a lawyer and member of parliament, argued 
on grounds of intentionality that the two were different: 
I would not recommend giving persons who come over to India on Pakistani 
passports exactly the same facilities as those who come over on Migration 
Certificates. Some difference must be made between those who leave East Bengal 
definitely with the intention of migrating to India and becoming Indian citizens 
irrevocably; and those who come with an unsettled mind on Pakistani passports and 
wish to keep a foot in both camps. If they find conditions in India more favourable, 
they would stay on in India; but if they did not they could go back to Pakistan on 
their Pakistani passports.
69
  
 
Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence For Tyabji, the link between 
nationality and passports was clear. Those with Pakistani passports should be treated as 
Pakistani citizens, irrespective of whether they were Hindus or Muslims. 
In contrast C.C. Biswas, the minister for Law and Minority Affairs, argued that 
rather than being an indication of an ‘unsettled mind’, the acquisition of a Pakistani 
passport was utilitarian: ‘More often than not, this is the safer and easier course which 
saves the migrant from the “special searches” and “other harassments” to which holders 
of Migration Certificates are subjected’.70 For Biswas, the final intention of both 
groups—Hindus with migration certificates and Hindus with Pakistani passports—was to 
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migrate to India. Intention, rather than documentation, he argued, should determine 
citizenship and both groups should be treated equally by India. 
Y.K. Puri, a high-level MEA diplomat, disagreed on legal and constitutional 
grounds. He pointed out that Indian authorities had no legal basis to cancel a Pakistani 
passport and cited the following example:  
Suppose that we withdraw or cancel the Pakistan passport and issue the holder an 
Indian passport for a visit to East Bengal, the government of Pakistan may refuse to 
recognize the change of nationality, may refuse to permit the person to enter Pakistan 
on an Indian passport or let him depart from Pakistan once he gets there.
71
 
 
Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence Puri agreed that Hindus from East 
Pakistan were Pakistani nationals, but also suggested that India should provide them with 
free visa extensions and lift travel restrictions within India.  
This discussion, carrie4d out via high-level bureaucratic letters and memos, 
highlights a significant addition to the mandate of the Scheme. While it would continue to 
categorise and legitimise inter-Dominion mobility, the multitude of travel documents 
would further link and determine the nationality of its holders. These documents offered 
different outcomes regarding nationality, depending on whether the travellers were 
Hindus or Muslims.  
  
Documenting Muslim Nationality 
The Scheme became one of the central mechanisms, along with the Indian 
Constitution of 1950, the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955 and the amended Foreigner’s 
Act of 1957, in evaluating and determining claims of Indian citizenship. Such claims, 
while guided by regulations on domicile and birth, were also determined on the basis of 
                                                        
71
 Y.K. Puri, 23 April 1953, MEA, PV III, FII/53-PSP, NAI.  
H. Roy 
 28 
who could and did hold an Indian passport. For Muslims who had either gone to Pakistan 
in the aftermath of 1947 and hoped to return home to India, or those who simply travelled 
to Pakistan to visit relatives or on regular work, an application for a travel document 
raised intriguing questions of nationality and belonging: Was an application for an India–
Pakistan passport (to travel to Pakistan) a confirmation of lack of allegiance to India? 
Could Muslims who returned to India on Pakistani passports, like members of the Hindu 
minorities, renounce their passports and be regarded as Indians? 
 Muslims who worked in Pakistan but maintained families and properties in India 
were the first major group to anticipate the problematic linkages between residence and 
citizenship that the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme failed to resolve. Muslims 
in India and Hindus in Pakistan who worked in government and military offices had been 
given the option to work with the government of their choice. Over a thousand such men 
who worked in the East Bengal Railways resigned in early 1952 in anticipation of the 
passport system restricting travel to India.
72
 The Scheme mandated that in order to work 
for the Pakistan government in East Pakistan, Muslims would have to acquire Pakistani 
passports for travel between their families in India and their work in East Pakistan. Their 
applications for Indian passports were routinely denied on the grounds that they were not 
Indian citizens and hence were ineligible. Citizenship in this instance was determined by 
the Indian Constitution which stated that one needed to be domiciled within the territories 
of India on 26 January 1950, the date of promulgation of the Constitution.
73
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Tridip Kumar Chaudhuri, a Lok Sabha MP from Murshidabad, took up the case of 
some of these workers in the Indian parliament. He argued that refusal of an Indian 
passport was unconstitutional since these men were registered to vote in India.
74
 In 
response, Anil Chanda, the MEA deputy minister, argued that domicile rather than voting 
rights determined one’s citizenship. According to Chanda, those without domicile in 
India on 26 January 1950 were ‘migrants’ and were deemed to have ‘migrated to 
Pakistan. Thus they were not Indian nationals and were ineligible for Indian passports’.75. 
To ensure the ability to travel and visit their families, these men and others like them had 
no option but to apply for Pakistani passports. However, this automatically disqualified 
them from claims to Indian citizenship as per Article 9 of the Indian Constitution, a 
disqualification that was reiterated in the Indian Citizenship Act of 1955.  
The links between the India–Pakistan passports and Indian citizenship became 
clear in the well-known case of a minor, Wajid Alam.
76
 Alam, who had lived with his 
mother Bibi Sahar Bano in Gaya, Bihar, had moved to East Pakistan in 1952 when he 
was 12. Around mid 1954 he had decided to return home to Gaya, but realised he had 
missed the deadline to procure a repatriation certificate from the Indian embassy in 
Dhaka. His only option to return home was to get a Pakistani passport. He arrived in 
India on a short-term visa with this passport. He continued to live in India, requesting 
visa extensions until 1956, when the Bihar authorities refused to grant an extension and 
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requested him to leave India and apply to the Indian High Commission in Karachi for the 
next extension. At this point his mother, Bibi Sahar Bano, decided to contest the denial 
and brought a writ petition against the Bihar government.  
In her petition, Bibi Sahar Bano made two critical arguments in disputing the 
claim that her son’s Pakistani passport made him a Pakistani national: (1) her son did not 
need an Indian visa since he was an Indian citizen; and (2) his travel to East Pakistan was 
not ‘voluntary’ because he was a minor at the time. Furthermore, her son had ‘obtained 
the Pakistan passport merely as a device to come back to India and that he had not the 
intention of becoming a citizen of Pakistan’.77 Therefore, in 1954 Wajid Alam had had no 
intention of becoming a Pakistani national, nor had he had the legal capability to make 
such a decision. The Pakistani passport, the petition argued, was a travel document, a 
utilitarian device to enable him to return to his home in India. 
Beyond the deliberations of the Patna High Court, the case received much 
attention from authorities at the ministries of Home Affairs and Law.
78
 The latter’s 
response to Alam’s case is worth noting. The Law authorities disputed Bano’s petition on 
two grounds: first, they argued that Wajid Alam had ‘migrated’ to East Pakistan and had 
acquired the Pakistani passport voluntarily. To support this claim, they argued that Alam 
was not a minor since the India–Pakistan passport was only issued to adults.79 They 
argued that even though Pakistan might have a lower age limit for recognising an adult, 
the fact that he had been regarded as an adult in Pakistan meant he could not now claim 
to be a minor in India. Secondly, they argued that if Alam was indeed an Indian citizen, 
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then he should have made a claim to citizenship immediately upon his return. His claim 
was being made now only because he had been denied a visa extension. Consequently, 
there was not sufficient proof of ‘intent’ that Alam wanted to make India his home.  
The Patna High Court’s decision in favour of Sahr Bano and its instruction to 
Alam to apply for Indian citizenship stepped on the toes of the MHA and Law ministry 
bureaucrats, who noted petulantly: ‘We can of course refuse to register Wajid Alam as an 
Indian citizen without assigning any reason…. We may also add that application of Wajid 
Alam for Indian citizenship should not be accepted but should be referred to the Central 
Government for orders’.80 Although it is unclear whether Alam did apply for Indian 
citizenship or whether his application was eventually approved, the case was significant 
because it established precedence in legal terms and helped the MHA craft a clear process 
for subsequent cases.
81
 From this point on, the central government became the arbiter in 
the cases of those who arrived in India with Pakistani passports but claimed Indian 
citizenship. The number and frequency of such cases in the late 1950s and 1960s 
highlights the disjunction between official understanding of the India–Pakistan passport 
as a document certifying nationality, even when it had no legal basis, and the popular 
perception of the passport as a practical document facilitating travel.  
By the time the Indian Citizenship Act came into force in 1955, visas for travel to 
India had largely become short-term, usually for three months. Consequently, travel had 
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become ‘temporary’ even as passport applications and requests for extensions of short-
term visas became commonplace. What also assumed regularity were violations of visa 
directives, especially for ‘overstaying’ beyond the stipulated period.82 Local authorities 
often served deportation notices on those whose visas had expired. These notices were 
frequently countered by applications for permanent settlement in India.
83
 Sometimes they 
were contested in court via submission of writ petitions under Section 80 of the Code of 
Civil Procedure.
84
 In both applications for permanent settlement and writ petitions, the 
usual outcome was an extension of stay for the petitioner. Local authorities in 
Maharashtra noted: ‘The application for civil suit takes more than year and many times it 
is dismissed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. This enables them to file a fresh 
application and thus they prolong their stay in India as much as possible’.85 What is 
apparent from these manoeuvrings is that some travellers had quickly figured out a 
process by which they could hope to circumvent the Indian state’s controls over their 
mobility.  
For their part, Indian authorities declined petitions routinely. Beyond pointing out 
that the applicants had returned to India after officially-mandated cut-off dates, and had 
violated the visa regulations by overstaying,
86 
they often regarded the possession of a 
Pakistani passport as definitive proof of a Muslim petitioner’s nationality. By 1960, 
                                                        
82
 Bombay and West Bengal were the primary sites with the most violations. Secret 
memorandum, 1 December 1954, MHA, Foreigner’s IV, 1/1/56-FIV, NAI. 
83
 The Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation was in charge of reviewing these applications since 
the applicant’s citizenship was not in question, and the authorities needed to verify that the 
applicant would not seek relief and rehabilitation as a ‘refugee’ or make claims to evacuee 
property. 
84
 This particular section dealt with writ petitions against the Indian government or officials of the 
government. 
85
 Inter-departmental letter, 21 Sept. 1961, MHA, 29/5/61-FIV (A), NAI. 
86
 ‘Deportation of Certain Section of Muslims of Bombay-Pakistani nationals’, MHA, 20/30/58-
FIII, NAI. 
South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 
 33 
Indian ministry authorities were instructing their state counterparts to immediately report 
any pertinent writ petitions against the government, popularly known as 80 CPC 
petitions, so that 
Full facts of the case may be collected immediately and furnished to this Ministry 
(MHA) along with the observations and recommendations of the state government so 
as to enable the Central Government to determine the nationality within the notice 
period. After it has been determined that [the] person has ceased to be an Indian 
citizen, he can straightaway be deported to Pakistan after serving him with an order 
to leave India without any formalities.
87
  
 
Note to typesetter: Please do not indent this sentence Contesting the legality of 
deportation notices through civil suits required the petitioner to either find fault with the 
government on grounds of procedure, or to claim Indian citizenship. The outcomes of 
such suits involved the regional High Courts and sometimes the Supreme Court of India. 
After Wajid Alam’s case, the New Delhi ensured that it would be the primary arbitrator 
in such cases of disputed nationality. 
The contextual interpretation of citizenship laws and the links between the India–
Pakistan passport and national identity became clear in the case of Haroon Haji Shakoor 
who had petitioned authorities in Bombay for ‘permanent stay’.88 Like Wajid Alam, 
Shakoor had been born in India and was taken to West Pakistan as a minor while his 
parents continued to live in India. In 1956, upon his father’s death, Shakoor acquired a 
Pakistani passport and returned to India. Between 1956 and 1961, he went back and forth 
between the two countries before finally applying for ‘permanent settlement’ in India.89 
In his petition, Shakoor stressed that he was an Indian citizen with no ‘love for Pakistan’. 
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Local authorities in Bombay disagreed, noting that ‘he would not make good citizenship 
of India [sic]’. Unlike Alam’s case, the MHA sought to disregard the fact that Shakoor 
was a minor when he first went to Pakistan. Instead, what was significant was that 
Shakoor had not returned to India immediately upon becoming an adult. Moreover, the 
ministry determined that Shakoor’s patriotic claims had little merit and his petition was a 
ruse to extend his stay in India so he could be with his mother. 
Denial of Shakoor’s application was almost inevitable. Shakoor’s Pakistani 
passport was taken as definitive proof of his nationality and the MHA advised authorities 
in Bombay to ‘issue a deportation order against the Pakistani national for his immediate 
expulsion from India’.90 As a result, both the assumptions made about nationality and the 
actions that followed found sanction in the documentary proof provided by the India–
Pakistan passport. What is also significant is the contrast between common 
understandings of a passport as a travel document, and the official use of it to prove the 
‘Pakistani’ nationality of certain Muslims. 
In contrast to Alam’s and Shakoor’s cases, Mohsin Khan’s application for 
permanent stay had a very different outcome.
91
 Seemingly, Khan, a tailor by profession, 
had a similar trajectory to Alam and Shakoor. He and his family had migrated to Pakistan 
in 1947, returned to India in 1955 on a Pakistan passport and a short-term Indian visa, 
and then applied for permanent resettlement. Local authorities in their home state of Uttar 
Pradesh advised them of their ineligibility and suggested they return to Pakistan and 
apply for permanent resettlement in India from there. Khan went to Pakistan but returned 
to India in 1957 on another short-term visa. By 1958, he had ‘overstayed’ and when 
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Indian authorities sent him notice to this effect, they discovered that he and his family 
had ‘disappeared’. Authorities finally located them in Delhi and began legal proceedings 
for the family’s deportation.  
At this point, Mohsin Khan appealed to the chief commissioner of Delhi for 
clemency, arguing he was a ‘faithful and loyal citizen of India’. Although the chief 
commissioner had little power in arbitrating such cases, Khan, who had been a tailor to 
the high-level bureaucrat hoped that such access might help his case. The chief 
commissioner wrote to the MHA requesting a positive outcome for Khan’s application. 
The fact that Khan did not own any property in India and had no claims to evacuee 
property helped further his case. In 1962, the MHA finally decided in favour of Khan’s 
petition, with the caveat that he would have to retain his Pakistani nationality. Khan’s 
access to bureaucratic patronage had helped him remain in India, but his Pakistan 
passport was taken as documentary proof the family had divested itself of any claim of 
Indian citizenship.  
There were many such cases regarding the legitimacy of the movement of Muslim 
individuals and their contextual relationship with the documentary regime of the India–
Pakistan passport during the 1950s and 1960s. During this period the general Indian 
passport also contributed to framing an understanding of citizenship through documents. 
Mention may be made here of two writ petitions, one filed by a wealthy, Bombay-based 
Parsee, K.S. Nagporewalla and his wife in 1959, and the other filed by Satwant Singh 
Sawhney in 1967, both of which contested the right of the Indian state to deny a passport 
to citizens whose nationality was not in question. In the Sawhney case, which in a rare 
feat reached the Supreme Court, the right to free movement both within and outside India 
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was argued to be evidence of the ‘personal liberties’ guaranteed by the Indian 
Constitution. Chief Justice G. Subbarao agreed. He ruled: ‘A person resident in India has 
a fundamental right to travel abroad and the refusal by the government to issue him a 
passport is a denial of the rights to personal liberty, equality before the law guaranteed by 
the Constitution of India’.92 Thus, if the personal liberty of an Indian citizen included the 
right to travel, denial of a passport for no good reason could be linked to an infringement 
of individual citizenship rights by the state.
93
  
The Passport Act of 1967, brought in in the aftermath of the Sawhney case, 
sought to merge the India–Pakistan passport with the international one. It clarified that, 
from this point forward, passports and visas would guarantee travel but nothing else. 
Furthermore, both the MHA and the MEA delegated most of the authority for issuing 
passports to five regional passport centres across India. As a document guaranteeing the 
right to travel, the Indian passport would be available to all Indians and could only be 
denied under certain conditions. It would seem that the contextual delineation of 
citizenship under the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme had finally been put to 
rest.  
 
Conclusion: Documentary Mandates and Popular Understandings of Paper Rights 
Legally, the Indian passport is not a citizenship document; it only guarantees the right of 
mobility insofar as it guarantees the right to return to India. Nevertheless it continues to 
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be popularly perceived as a document which can certify one’s nationality and right of 
residence in India. This disjuncture between legal reality and popular perception 
originated in the ways in which the India–Pakistan Passport and Visa Scheme was 
implemented in the 1950s and the ways in which the India–Pakistan passport was used 
differently, to allow and extend citizenship claims to Hindus while denying them to 
Muslims others.  
By shifting focus away from Partition-related displacement to routine mobility in 
the 1950s and 1960s, I have tried to highlight the disjuncture between state documentary 
mandates and popular understandings of mobility controls, and provide a basis for 
understanding the persistent and growing linkages between documents and identities in 
contemporary India. Through the Scheme Indian authorities in the 1950s and 1960s used 
travel documents to determine citizenship and nationality. The paper trail of applications, 
petitions, official memos, and writ petitions also served to introduce the new Indian state 
to those who wanted to live within its borders. By contrast, individuals applying for 
India–Pakistan passport documents viewed them as merely utilitarian artefacts that would 
facilitate their movement between India and Pakistan. But the applicants were also aware 
of the potential for these documents to mark nationality and guarantee the right to work 
and remain in India, by either overriding or confirming other legal, bureaucratic criteria 
such as birthplace, domicile, and property ownership. Bureaucratic and legal interactions 
between Indian authorities and putative citizens under the rubric of the Scheme thus 
created the perception that passports certified citizenship. Even though the Passport Act 
of 1967 completely repudiated this position and clearly designated the Indian passport as 
H. Roy 
 38 
only a travel document, the already-established links between such documents and 
citizenship would not be overturned.  
Subsequent decades have witnessed repeated claims for citizenship on the part of 
those whose presence in India has come under official scrutiny.
94
 In the absence of ‘paper 
rights’ or documents certifying citizenship, it is the ‘citizen’ who has learned only too 
well the important lesson of creating a documentary trail to prove citizenship. Access to 
travel documents continues to delineate the lines between legal and illegal, between 
citizens and infiltrators, and between legitimate and illegitimate migration. For example, 
those residents of north-eastern borderland states, especially Bengali Muslims who are 
either citizens of India or Bangladesh remain targets of border control; (For example, 
Indian citizens living in the northeastern borderland states, especially Bengali Muslims, 
both within India and from Bangladesh, remain targets of border control;) in the absence 
of documentary proof, they are viewed as ‘infiltrators’ or ‘illegal migrants’. These 
‘infiltrators’ continue to proffer the Indian passport and other documents as proof of their 
citizenship amidst bureaucratic assertions of forgery.
95
 The Indian passport continues to 
exist beyond its legal scope, acting as a document that promises inclusion (or exclusion) 
within the contemporary Indian body politic.
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